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BANKRUPTCY SECTION 363(b) SALES:
MARKET TEST PROCEDURES AND
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF EXPEDITED
SALES MAY PREVENT ABUSES AND
SAFEGUARD CREDITORS WITHOUT
LIMITING THE POWER OF THE COURTS
INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 2009, Chrysler LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection after failing to reach an agreement with lenders to restructure its
debt.1 President Barack H. Obama promised a quick bankruptcy process,
with one senior official predicting that the process could be completed
within thirty to sixty days.2 The government’s promises were fulfilled on
May 31, 2009, when Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court
Judge Arthur Gonzalez issued a decision approving a sale of the
corporation’s main business assets to a newly formed entity, “New
Chrysler.”3 After an expedited appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
issued a bench decision affirming the Bankruptcy Court on June 5, 2009,
and released a full written decision two months later.4 Later that year,
Chrysler’s “Big Three”5 brother, General Motors, Corp., filed for Chapter
11.6 Similar to Chrysler, General Motor’s path through bankruptcy took
approximately one month.7 As was the case in Chrysler,8 the debtor in
General Motors, with the approval and order of the Court, used Bankruptcy
Code (the Code) § 363(b)9 to sell the General Motors assets to a new entity,
“New General Motors.”10 Further, in both cases, the federal government
was highly involved, with the Treasury Department (Treasury) providing
financing for the bankruptcies and the government—along with the United
Auto Workers Union—acquiring ownership of a large portion of the new
entities.11
1. See In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 87–88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
2. Chris Isidore, Chrysler Files For Bankruptcy, CNNMONEY.com, May 1, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/30/news/companies/chrysler_bankruptcy/index.html.
3. In re Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 84–92, 113.
4. In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler II), 576 F.3d 108, 109, 127 (2d Cir. 2009).
5. The “Big Three” refers to the three major American automotive companies: General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.
6. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“On June 1, 2009
. . . GM filed its chapter 11 petition in this court.”).
7. See id. at 520 (approving the 363(b) sale of the assets of General Motors to a purchaser
“New GM” on Sunday, July 5, 2009).
8. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 87.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006); discussion infra Part II.
10. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 473.
11. Mike Ramsey & Lizzie O’Leary, Fiat Said to Buy Chrysler Assets Today to Form New
Automaker, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 10, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aAB9jCmPBUQU (“Chrysler Group LLC, will be owned 20 percent by Turin, Italy-
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In all likelihood, neither General Motors nor Chrysler could have
survived a long, drawn-out bankruptcy process.12 Some commentators
argue the short processes and use of § 363(b) sales were vital to prevent the
companies’ collapse and a resulting loss of the production, jobs, and
stability that they provide.13 However, even if the quick sale of the two auto
giants was the correct and legal course of action, questions remain as to
whether the Chrysler and General Motors cases will serve as precedent for
a more liberal use of these expedited sales procedures.14 Further, if the use
of § 363(b) sales does increase, what consequences await? And if these
consequences are negative or undesirable, can anything be done to mitigate
them while preserving the flexibility and benefits the use of such sales
provides bankruptcy judges and filers alike?
Despite the many conveniences and benefits of § 363(b) sales,
additional procedural safeguards should be put in place to prevent abuses
from occurring. This note proposes a robust market test for § 363(b) sales
that requires: 1) disclosure of sales terms; 2) adequate time for market
based Fiat, 9.85 percent by the U.S., 2.46 percent by Canada and 67.69 percent by a United Auto
Workers union retiree health care trust fund. The U.S. and Canadian governments financed the
sale with $2 billion.”); Emily Chasan & Phil Wahba, GM Asks for Bankruptcy Sale in 30 Days,
REUTERS, June 1, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE
5507X420090601 (“Under a government-backed restructuring plan, the Obama administration
would take a 60 percent stake in the newly-formed company made up of GM’s most profitable
assets. The UAW would have a 17.5 percent stake, the Canadian government would own about 12
percent and GM bondholders would receive about 10 percent.”).
12. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83
AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 544 (2009) (noting that “liquidating a company the size of Chrysler would
have cost millions of dollars”). The U.S. Treasury and Canadian government officials also wanted
an “expedited” process to “preserve the value of the business, restore consumer confidences, and
avoid the costs of a lengthy chapter 11 process.” Id. at 536–37.
13. See A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General
Motors: a Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 567–68 (2010) (discussing the rapid erosion of
assets and “going concern value” of Chrysler LLC in the Chrysler case). As of early 2009,
“General Motors employed approximately 235,000 employees worldwide” and had assets of $82
billion. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 475. Chrysler employed approximately 55,000
employees and had revenue of nearly $50 billion for the year prior to its bankruptcy petition. In re
Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 88–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
14. Multiple commentators have questioned the state of bankruptcy law after General Motors
and Chrysler. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After
Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 305 (2010).
The recent bankruptcy cases of Chrysler and General Motors were successful in that
they quickly removed assets from the burden of unmanageable debt amidst a global
recession, but the price of this achievement was unnecessarily high because the cases
established or buttressed precedent for the disregard of creditor rights. As a result, the
automaker bankruptcies may usher in a period where the threat of insolvency will
increase the cost of capital in an economy where affordable credit is sorely needed.
Id.; Robert M. Fishman & Gordon E. Gouveia, What's Driving Section 363 Sales After Chrysler
and General Motors?, 19 NORTON. J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4, Art. 2 (2010) (“Do the Chrysler and
General Motors cases represent a new paradigm in which preserving going concern value and jobs
take precedence over the protections that Chapter 11 has traditionally afforded to creditors?”)
(citations omitted).
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players to bid on the asset; and 3) centralized review of competing bids.
Additionally, where “time is of the essence” and a market test is either
impossible or impractical, heightened judicial review should substitute for
such a test. Part I of this note provides the history of pre-confirmation asset
sales in bankruptcy proceedings. Part II compares § 363(b) sales with
bankruptcy reorganization plan confirmations and analyzes the benefits and
detriments of each. Part III proposes a robust market test procedure to be
implemented in § 363(b) sales and heightened scrutiny for “time is of the
essence” sales, where a robust market test is impossible. The note concludes
by explaining the significance and drawbacks of this proposal and what
future problems may arise in § 363(b) sales.
I. HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY PRE-CONFIRMATION
ASSET SALE
Section 363(b), used in both Chrysler and General Motors, provides a
means by which a bankruptcy judge can order a company to sell assets
before a bankruptcy plan confirmation is reached.15 The procedure involves
a showing of cause for the sale and courts allow creditors the opportunity to
object.16 The use of these pre-confirmation sales is expressly provided for in
11 U.S.C. § 363(b), enacted in 1978.17 The provisions of this section of the
Code apply equally to a debtor in possession (DIP or debtor) as they do to a
trustee.18 Additionally, the “other than in the ordinary course of business”
clause has been read broadly to allow sales of entire business entities.19
Section 363(b) sales have been used in some of the largest and most
well-known bankruptcies, including those of Enron and the two recent

15. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006).
16. Id.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) states the following:
(b)(1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate, . . .
(B) after appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman in accordance with
section 332, and after notice and a hearing, the court approves such sale or
such lease—
(i) giving due consideration to the facts, circumstances, and conditions of
such sale or such lease; and
(ii) finding that no showing was made that such sale or such lease would
violate applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Id.

18. For the purposes of § 363, the debtor in possession enjoys the same rights and benefits
under the Code as those prescribed to the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1107, 1108 (2006).
19. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 489–90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re
Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Torch Offshore, Inc.,
327 B.R. 254 (E.D. La 2005).
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automotive manufacturer bankruptcies.20 Academic appraisal of § 363(b)
sales has varied, with some advocating for their use as a model to which all
large bankruptcies should aspire,21 while others have criticized the use of
such sales, claiming that they subvert the bankruptcy system and are ripe
for abuse.22
Expedited pre-confirmation sales procedures have a long history in
American bankruptcy law, with statutory authority for such sales enacted as
early as 1867.23 The evolution of § 363(b) sales since that time provides
meaningful insight into the drafters’ purpose and intent in crafting the
procedures for these sales.
A. PRE-CONFIRMATION SALE OF ASSETS IN
BANKRUPTCY PRIOR TO THE 1978 BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 provided that the court may order the sale
of the estate of the debtor if it finds that it “is of a perishable nature, or
liable to deteriorate in value . . . .”24 The Second Circuit, in 1913, held that
the concept of “perishable” was not only limited to the physical nature of
the object but also to the price of the object.25 The Ninth Circuit, using as a
standard for determining the validity of a sale the deterioration of monetary
value as well as physical deterioration, reached the same result twenty years
later in Hill v. Douglas, upholding the sale of road-making equipment to
prevent repossession.26

20. See, e.g., Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 113, In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 520, In re Enron
Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also The 10 Largest U.S. Bankruptcies,
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2009/fortune/0905/gallery.largest_bankrup
CNNMONEY.COM,
tcies.fortune/index.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
21. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain
a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153
(2004); Bryant P. Lee, Note, Chapter 18? Imagining Future Uses of 11 U.S.C. § 363 to
Accomplish Chapter 7 Liquidation Goals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 520.
22. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1, 13 (2007); Chad P. Pugatch, Craig A. Pugatch & Travis Vaughan, The Lost Art of Chapter 11
Reorganization, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 58 (2008); Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan
of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J 37, 63
(1999); Elizabeth B. Rose, Note, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b): The Opportunity for
Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 249 (2006)
(citing Administration of Large Business Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Has Competition for Big
Cases Corrupted the Bankruptcy System?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of Lynn M.
LoPucki)).
23. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 528 (1867).
24. Id.
25. In re Pedlow, 209 F. 841, 842 (2d Cir. 1913).
26. Hill v. Douglass, 78 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1935).
It will be conceded that road-making equipment is not within the ordinary concept of
perishable property. Yet the courts have been liberal in their construction of this term
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In the Chandler Act of 1938 (the Chandler Act), the immediate
precursor to the current Code, § 116(3) provided that a sale could be
ordered “upon cause shown.”27 This standard was generally read as an
extension of the “perishable” concept that existed prior to the Chandler Act
and pre-confirmation sales persisted as the exceptional remedy.28 The
circuit courts split in their approach to the validity of sales pursuant to §
116(3) of the Chandler Act.29 The Second Circuit took a broad view of the
statute and, in Frank v. Drinc-O-Matic, Inc., gave the bankruptcy judge
wide discretion in ordering such sales by adopting an abuse of discretion
standard.30 In subsequent cases, the court found that varying conditions
such as inability of a debtor to redeem property, failure to pass a plan of
reorganization, and the wasting away of an asset were appropriate
conditions for the ordering of a pre-confirmation sale.31
Not all circuits liberally interpreted the Chandler Act.32 The Third
Circuit, in In re Solar Mfg. Corp., limited the use of § 116(3) procedures to
“emergency” situations, involving an “imminent” loss of assets.33 That
reasoning was even adopted, albeit for only a short period of time, by the
Second Circuit in In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., where the court required
a showing of imminent loss to effectuate a sale.34 However, from the 1950s
and have held it to include not only that which may deteriorate physically, but that
which is liable to deteriorate in price and value.
Id. (citing In re Pedlow, 209 F. 841 (2d Cir. 1913); In re Inter-City Trust, 295 F. 495, 497 (9th
Cir. 1924)).
27. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1067–68 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing the Chandler Act of
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938)).
28. See id. at 1066–67.
29. Compare In re Sire Plan Inc., 332 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1964) (approving a sale where
the hotel, at the time a skeletal frame, was wasting away), In re Marathon Foundry and Machine
Co., 228 F.2d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 1955) (approving the sale of stock where trustee had insufficient
assets to redeem the stock), and Frank v. Drinc-O-Matic, 136 F.2d 906, 906 (2d Cir. 1943)
(approving sale of vending machines where machines were encumbered by liens and trustee had
insufficient funds to redeem machines), with In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493, 494 (3d Cir.
1949) (denying the sale of business despite record losses and deterioration of real estate values
because the sale did not meet “emergency” requirements).
30. See Frank, 136 F.2d at 906.
31. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 492 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he
market value of Liberty was likely to deteriorate in the near future . . . .”); In re Sire, 332 F.2d at
499 (“[T]he Trustees’ evidence demonstrated at hearing [that] the partially constructed building is
a ‘wasting asset.’”); In re Marathon, 228 F.2d at 594 (“The trustees had not sufficient funds with
which to redeem the pledged stock.”); Frank, 136 F.2d at 906 (“The trustee had no funds with
which to redeem the machines, and after six months no plan of reorganization had been
proposed.”).
32. See, e.g., Solar Mfg., 176 F.2d at 494–95.
33. Id.
34. In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 188 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The debtor here,
therefore, was obliged to allege and had the burden of proving the existence of an emergency
involving imminent danger of loss of the assets if they were not promptly sold.”). The emergency
requirement was then replaced only thirteen years later by the “best interest” test. In re Sire, 332
F.2d at 497.
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on, courts began to uphold more sales in which the sale was justified as in
the “best interest of the [] estate”;35 circumstances that warranted the order
of a sale included a likely fall in market value, heavy interest charges and
deteriorating stock value.36
Despite the removal of the “perishability” term from the Bankruptcy
Act, the circumstances of the above cases indicated that the “perishability”
standard remained in place after the adoption of the Chandler Act, whether
through the “emergency” or “best interest of the estate” standards.37
B. 1978 BANKRUPTCY CODE, SECTION 363(b) SALES
PROCEDURES
The current Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 and became
effective for all cases filed after October 1, 1979.38 The Code amended and
replaced the Bankruptcy Act.39 The Code provided a bankruptcy judge with
the power to order a sale of the debtor’s assets under §§ 363(b) and 363(f).40
Section 363(b) gave statutory strength to the use of such sales without the
“perishable” standard of the 1867 act or the “upon cause shown” standard
of the Chandler Act, requiring only “notice and a hearing” to effectuate a
sale.41 This language, which was more relaxed than the prior enactments,
provided little guidance as to the circumstances under which a sale may be
approved, or what the procedural safeguards of “notice and a hearing”
provided for creditors opposed to the sale actually required.42
C. IN RE WHITE MOTOR CREDIT CORP. AND THE
“EMERGENCY” DOCTRINE
In In re White Motor Credit Corp., the bankruptcy court interpreted the
newly promulgated Code43 as not authorizing a “sale of all or substantially
all assets of the estate.”44 However, the court “left the [former] ‘emergency’

35. See, e.g., In re Equity Funding, 492 F.2d at 794 (“[T]he proposed sale would be in the best
interest of the bankrupt estate. Based upon these findings, which are not clearly erroneous, the
trial court could properly conclude that there was ‘cause shown’ for the approval pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 516(3).”); Frank, 136 F.2d at 906 (approving sales after concluding that it was “desirable
for debtor”).
36. See In re Sire, 332 F.2d at 499 (wasting asset likely to deteriorate in value); In re Equity
Funding, 492 F.2d at 794 (declining value of stock held by trustee); In re Marathon, 228 F.2d at
598–99 (discussing how interest charges prevented debtor from being able to redeem stock).
37. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).
38. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C.).
39. See id.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2006).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069; In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940
(5th Cir. 1983).
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
44. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
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exception45 in tact . . . .”46 The court concluded that an imminent loss of $40
million in the value of assets of the estate provided the necessary showing
of an “emergency” to approve a sale of the assets.47 This decision appeared
to severely limit courts’ ability to order pre-confirmation sales and to
undermine the broad language of the Code.48 However, subsequent opinions
would expand and more clearly define the extent to which bankruptcy
courts could approve pre-confirmation sales.49
D. IN RE LIONEL CORP. AND THE “GOOD BUSINESS
REASON” STANDARD
Despite the absence of guiding language in § 363(b), the Second
Circuit, in In re Lionel Corp., found that the Code’s legislative history
suggested that the framers intended to require a trustee or debtor to justify
the use of a pre-confirmation sale.50 However, the court stated that the
“perishability” and “emergency” standards that were formerly employed
were no longer required.51 The court held that to properly order a sale
pursuant to § 363(b), a “good business reason” for such an order must be
provided before the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.52 The court
listed the following factors as persuasive in finding a business justification
for the sale of assets:
[T]he proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole, the amount
of elapsed time since the filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization
will be proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be
obtained from the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals of the property,
which of the alternatives of use, sale or lease the proposal envisions and,
most importantly perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in
value.53

The court found that the underlying asset in the case—stock owned by
the corporation—was not wasting, nor was there an “emergency” requiring
its sale.54 The panel held the sale improper, even though it applied the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See discussion supra Part I.A.
See In re White Motor, 14 B.R. at 590.
See id.
See generally In re White Motor, 14 B.R. 584; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Braniff Airways, Inc.,
700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983).
50. See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069 (“the statute requires notice and a hearing, and these
procedural safeguards would be meaningless absent a further requirement that reasons be given
for whatever determination is made . . . .”).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 1071.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1071–72.
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highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.55 The court continued that
although it sympathized with the bankruptcy court’s desire to expedite the
proceedings, “‘[t]he need for expedition, however, is not a justification for
abandoning proper standards.’”56 Although the Lionel court found no
business justification in the case, the decision’s central holding—that a
debtor or trustee attempting to use a § 363(b) sale must provide business
justification for the sale57—has provided precedential support for a
broadening of the bankruptcy courts’ power to authorize such sales.58 Lionel
is currently the standard under which proposed § 363(b) sales are judged.
In the Chrysler bankruptcy, the court justified the § 363(b) sale by
finding that Chrysler was an asset wasting away in bankruptcy.59 Chrysler
was shutting down factories and required immense funding merely to
sustain operations, and Fiat—the only available purchaser for Chrysler—
insisted that the sale be completed within a certain period of time.60 In
General Motors, the fact that the government predicated its financing on the
consummation of a quick § 363(b) sale provided a sufficiently “good
business reason” to justify the sale.61 This type of “time is of the essence”
justification may be invoked by a debtor requesting that the court approve a
sale before the purchaser is able to pull out of the agreement.62
55. See id.
56. Id. at 1071 (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc.
v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 450 (1968)).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Chrysler LLC
(Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 726
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Medical Software Solutions, 286 B.R. 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
59. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 96.
60. See id. at 96–97.
The Governmental Entities, the funding sources for the Fiat Transaction, have
emphasized that the financing offered is contingent upon a sale closing quickly.
Moreover, if a sale has not closed by June 15th, Fiat could withdraw its commitment.
Thus, the Debtors were confronted with either (a) a potential liquidation of their assets
which would result in closing of plants and layoffs, impacting suppliers, dealers,
workers and retirees, or (b) a government-backed purchase of the sale of their assets
which allowed the purchaser to negotiate terms with suppliers, vendors, dealerships and
workers to satisfy whatever obligations were owed to these constituencies.
Id.

61. See In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 480.
To facilitate the process, the U.S. Treasury and the governments of Canada and
Ontario (through their Export Development Canada (‘EDC’)) agreed to provide DIP
financing for GM through the chapter 11 process. But they would provide the DIP
financing only if the sale of the purchased assets occurred on an expedited basis.
Id. (emphasis in original).
62. See Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Court of Appeals Upholds Chrysler Sale to Fiat, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2009, at B2 (“Lawyers for Chrysler and the government argued that the sale to Fiat
needed to be completed as quickly as possible to preserve its viability and to save thousands of
jobs. Fiat can walk away if no agreement is struck by June 15.”).
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E. IN RE BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC. AND THE SUB ROSA
OBJECTION
Decided the same year as Lionel, In re Braniff provided that a § 363(b)
sale that distributes assets among creditors was inappropriate and
constituted a sub rosa plan that attempted to bypass the protections of
Chapter 11 plan confirmation proceedings.63 In Braniff, the debtor
attempted to sell its property—which included airplane leases, equipment,
terminal leases, airport slots, and other assets—to a new entity, PSA,64 in
exchange for right to travel on PSA that would be allocated to former
creditors, employees, and shareholders.65 Of particular importance, the
Braniff court held that a release of claims or payment of prepetition debts is
not a “‘use, sale or lease’ and is not authorized by § 363(b).”66 The court did
state that “certain adjustments in the rights of creditors” are permitted in §
363(e) “to assure ‘adequate protection’” of the interests of secured
creditors.67 The court went on to hold that “[i]n any future attempts to
specify the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties
and the district court must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”68
This ban on sub rosa plans has been extended from § 363(b) sales to
settlement agreements in which assets of the estate are distributed.69 In In re
Iridium, the Second Circuit held that a settlement in the course of the
bankruptcy proceeding was inappropriate because it distributed assets to
prepetition creditors as part of the agreement.70 The court found that the
settlement allowed the negotiating parties to sidestep the “fair and
equitable” standard as well as the “absolute priority rule” of bankruptcy
plan confirmations.71 Although the Iridium court did not label the
settlement as a sub rosa plan, it stated that a settlement cannot be offered to
avoid the “strictures of the Bankruptcy Code.”72
63. See In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The debtor and the
Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for
confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection
with a sale of assets.”) (emphasis in the original). Many courts find that the use of such tools is
improper. See In re Westpoint Stevens Inc., 333 B.R. 30, 51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
64. See In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939. The PSA was an entity formed as part of the Braniff
Bankruptcy that took possession of the Braniff Airway’s assets in exchange for payoff of debts
and allocation of rights to travel on the new airline. See id.
65. Id. at 939–40.
66. See id. at 940.
67. Id. at 940 n.2. (“[The court] is aware that the Code provides for certain adjustments
pursuant to a valid § 363 transaction in order to provide ‘adequate protection’ to secured
creditors.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 361; 363(e) (1982)).
68. Id. at 940 (listing the applicable hurdles as “disclosure requirements” in 11 U.S.C. § 1125,
“voting” in 11 U.S.C. § 1126, “best interest of creditors test” in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), and the
“absolute priority rule” in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)).
69. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007).
70. See id. at 464.
71. Id. at 462–65.
72. Id. at 464.
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In both the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies, payouts to
prepetition creditors were part of the § 363(b) sales.73 In both cases, the
unions received significant shares of the “new” corporations without
providing new capital input.74 These actions were justified in both cases
because the workforce was necessary for the businesses to succeed and the
unions would provide significant value to the new corporations.75 However,
the payouts to the former pension funds in Chrysler and General Motors,
and the shares of the new enterprises given before other creditors were paid
out in both cases,76 could be interpreted as hallmarks of a sub rosa plan, in
which the unions, capable of scuttling the new businesses, gained
preferential treatment.77 In fact, in the Chrysler case, this was one basis
upon which the Indiana pension fund creditors challenged the propriety of
the sale.78

73. See In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 484 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the fact
that as part of § 363 sale, “New GM” infused capital into retirement fund of union auto workers);
In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing how the
U.S. government provided funding for workers’ pension fund through infusion of capital and
equity in reorganized company).
74. See In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 497–98; Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 99–100.
75. See Adler, supra note 14, at 310 (“[T]he payment to VEBA was . . . a prospective expense
that assured the company a needed supply of UAW workers, with the union thus portrayed as a
critical vendor of labor.”).
76. See id.
[In Chrysler,] the purchaser, “New Chrysler”—an affiliation of Fiat, the U.S. and
Canadian governments, and the United Auto Workers (“UAW”)—took the assets
subject to specified liabilities and interests. More specifically, New Chrysler assumed
about $4.5 billion of Chrysler's obligations to, and distributed 55% of its equity to, the
UAW's voluntary beneficiary employee association (“VEBA”) in satisfaction of old
Chrysler's approximately $10 billion unsecured obligation to the VEBA (which is a
retired workers benefit fund) . . . .
Id. at 306.
In General Motors' case, the purchaser, “New GM,” owned largely by the United States
Treasury, agreed to satisfy General Motors' approximately $20 billion pre-bankruptcy
obligation to the VEBA with a new $2.5 billion note as well as $6.5 billion of the new
entity's preferred stock, 17.5% of its common stock, and a warrant to purchase up to an
additional 2.5% of the equity; depending on the success of New GM, the VEBA claim
could be paid in full. As in Chrysler, the sale was to take place quickly, within weeks,
and the sale procedures required that, absent special exemption, any bidder who wished
to compete with government-financed entity was to assume liabilities to the UAW as a
condition of the purchase.
Id. at 312.
77. See id. at 313–15 (sale of underlying assets and distribution to unions deprived creditors of
the protections that they enjoy in a traditional reorganization).
78. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 97–100.
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II. SECTION 363(b) COMPARED TO BANKRUPTCY PLAN
CONFIRMATION
A. BANKRUPTCY PLAN CONFIRMATIONS
A Chapter 11 plan confirmation is a relatively democratic process,
requiring a debtor to propose a reorganization/distribution plan and work
with creditors to obtain their willing approval.79 Sales of the entire business
or sales of major business units may be part of the proposed plan.80 The
debtor has a period of exclusivity during which it alone may propose plans
to the creditors,81 and this period may be extended by petition to the trial
judge.82 During the plan confirmation period, the debtor may obtain exit
financing83 or an alternative to financing,84 divide creditors into classes,85
propose a viable post-bankruptcy business organization,86 and endeavor to
achieve consensus among creditors to support the plan.87 Through this
process, the debtor attempts to propose a plan that will satisfy the creditors
while providing the emerging business with an opportunity for a healthy
start.88
One path through which a plan may be confirmed is by having a
majority—defined as greater than half in number and two thirds in value of
all classes—approve it.89 The debtor is required to submit extensive
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006).
80. Id. § 1129(a)(11) (“Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation,
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under
the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.”).
81. Id. § 1121(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, only the debtor may file a
plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”).
82. Id. § 1121(d)(1) (“[O]n request of a party in interest made within the respective periods
specified in subsections (b) and (c) of this section and after notice and a hearing, the court may for
cause reduce or increase the 120-day period or the 180-day period referred to in this section.”).
83. See id. § 1129(a)(11) (requiring the reorganization to be viable, which in turn requires that
a reorganizing business in need of capital secure financing in order to have the plan confirmed).
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. A debtor may thus propose a sale of the
business entity as part of the reorganization, eliminating the need for further financing. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2006).
86. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
87. Id. § 1129(a).
88. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555 (1915).
It is the purpose of the bankrupt act to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for
distribution among creditors, and then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.
Id.

89. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006). Classes are defined by the debtor in the plan proposal. See id.
§ 1122. However, creditors may object to these classifications if they are not related to business
differences among the creditors. See, e.g., In re Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd., 994 F.2d 1160, 1166–67
(5th Cir. 1991). Differentiation among creditors has been held appropriate based on how the
claims were incurred, the ongoing business relationships between the creditors, and the post-
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documentation about the business, its valuation, and its prospects to the
creditors before a vote is taken on the plan.90
If the debtor is unable to achieve a consensual plan, it may force a
“cramdown” plan confirmation.91 A cramdown must meet all the
requirements of a consensual plan—absent the agreement of all classes—
and at least one impaired class must consent to the plan.92 Further, the plan
must be “fair and equitable”93 and abide by the “absolute priority rule.”94
The “fair and equitable” and “absolute priority rule” standards require that
the plan pay secured creditors for the full value of their collateral and
market interest before unsecured creditors receive any value.95 Unsecured
creditors, generally, must also be paid in full before equity holders receive
anything.96 These requirements assure that equity holders will receive no
value unless the higher priority credit classes are paid in full.97

confirmation relationships between the creditors. See, e.g., id. at 1167 (concluding that separation
of unsecured claims is permitted for a “good business reason”).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); see also In re Malek, 35 B.R. 443 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)
(outlining the requirements of adequate disclosure as part of a plan confirmation including
“financial information,” “liquidation analysis,” and “transactions with insiders”).
91. See, e.g., In re Briscoe, 994 F.2d at 1168–70 (describing a “cramdown” as a plan
confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) where a plan is ordered despite a lack of approval by all
impaired classes).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2006) (“If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least
one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined without
including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.”).
93. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
[T]he court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan
notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate
unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.
Id.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C).
See id.
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
See Peter C.L. Roth, Comment, Bankruptcy Law—The Absolute Priority Rule
Reasserted—No Equity Participation Without Tangible Capital Contribution, 23 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 857, 861 (1989) (citing Northern Pac. R.R., v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 501–04 (1913) (“One of
the original purposes of the [absolute priority] rule was to prevent senior secured creditors from
entering into collusive arrangements with friendly management to squeeze out the unsecured
debt.”)). However, there remains a way for “old equity” to become “new equity”: an old equity
holder may give an infusion of new capital and receive a payout less than or equal to that value in
equity in the reorganized business. See Bank of America Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 453–54 (1999) (“A truly full value transaction, on the other
hand, would pose no threat to the bankruptcy estate not posed by any reorganization, provided of
course that the contribution be in cash or be realizable money’s worth . . . .”). However, strong
limitations have been placed on this “new equity” exception including that the new ownership
cannot be “on account of” the antecedent debt. See id. at 451–53. Also, new capital, and not a
promise to work, must be infused into the business. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
U.S. 197, 203–05 (1988) (holding that debtor farmer’s promise to work on farm and provide
“labor, experience, and expertise” in exchange for equity in reorganized entity was inappropriate).
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Regardless of whether a plan’s confirmation is consensual or a
cramdown, any non-consenting creditor may object that the plan is either
not in her best interest98 or is unfeasible.99 For a plan to be in her “best
interest,” the creditor must receive at least as much as she would have in a
Chapter 7 liquidation.100 For example, if a fully secured creditor objects, she
must receive the full value of her claim with market interest rates applied.
Second, for a plan to be feasible, its proponent must show that the business
will remain viable and will not be liquidated shortly after confirmation—
unless that is part of the plan.101 The proponent must show this with
reasonable likelihood, though it need not be a certainty;102 however,
inadequate capitalization, and lack of a viable business plan are grounds
upon which a plan may be rejected as unfeasible.103
These elements demonstrate that the plan confirmation process gives a
much greater level of participation and protection to creditors than does a §
363(b) sale.104 Even though both processes will likely involve negotiations
between the debtor and creditors—and a resolution may be achieved over
the objections of certain creditors—the plan confirmation process provides
many avenues for a creditor to object and encourages consensus among
parties.105 Although having a plan confirmation does not ensure absolutely
against abuse or self-dealing, the definitive nature of the “absolute priority
rule” and the extensive required disclosures are likely to reduce the
possibility of insiders or equity holders receiving a payout at the expense of
creditors.106
However, there are certain indelible drawbacks of a plan confirmation.
First, the debtor will likely require exit financing in order for the business to
be viable post-bankruptcy—a problem that may be especially acute in
markets, such as the current one, in which credit is tight.107 The plan

98. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2006).
99. See id. § 1129(a)(11). Feasibility may be raised by any non-consenting creditor or the court
may analyze it sua sponte. See In re Malkus, Inc., No. 03-07711-GLP, 2004 WL 3202212, at *4
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2004).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2006).
101. Id. § 1129(a)(11); see In re Malkus, 2004 WL 3202212, at *4.
102. See Malkus, 2004 WL 3202212, at *4 (“Pursuant to § 1129(a)(11) a plan of reorganization
must be feasible. ‘Although success does not have to be guaranteed, the Court is obligated to
scrutinize a plan carefully to determine whether it offers a reasonable prospect of success and is
workable.’”) (quoting In re Yates Development, 258 B.R. 36, 44 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)).
103. See, e.g., id.
104. See Rose, supra note 22, at 256–58 (discussing the voting, classification and good faith
requirements as hallmarks of the Bankruptcy Code’s protection of creditors).
105. See discussion supra Part II.A.
106. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 39–45.
107. See Melvin Richardson, How Does a Tight Credit Market Affect the Economy?,
ASSOCIATED CONTENT FROM YAHOO (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.associatedcontent.com/
article/1138008/how_does_a_tight_credit_market_affect.html.
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confirmation period may take an inconveniently long time.108 During this
period, the debtor’s business, being tied up in court proceedings,109 may
suffer significant reputational damage.110 This reputational damage, coupled
with the debtor’s inability to obtain financing and the costs of running the
bankruptcy itself—including legal fees—may strain the business to the
point of collapse, causing the case to be converted to Chapter 7111 and the
creditors to lose the “going concern value” that Chapter 11 is intended to
preserve.112
B. SCHOLARLY DEBATE OVER § 363(b) SALES: PANACEA
FOR LARGE BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS OR AN
ALTERNATIVE VULNERABLE TO ABUSE?
Many academics have supported the use of § 363(b) sales.113 One
argument is that they insulate the sales of going concern businesses,
whereby sums of money are guaranteed and parties will determine
distributions after the sale from long confirmation processes.114 In a plan
reorganization, the business entity is kept within the bankruptcy estate for a
substantial period of time, where it incurs significant legal and
administrative costs, must secure operating capital, and suffers reputational
damage.115 In a § 363(b) sale, the debtor need not obtain DIP financing,116
108. See generally Miller & Waisman, supra note 21. Bankruptcy cases may take years to
complete whereas a § 363(b) sale may be consummated in a few months, or even significantly
less. See generally id.
109. Id. at 187–89 (arguing that bankruptcy proceedings may evolve into a confrontation of
wills, where a creditor may prolong the process in hopes of forcing a concession).
110. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231,
235–36 (2001) (describing reputation damage along with other distractions that companies suffer
from bankruptcies, which leads to reorganized public companies filing repeatedly for bankruptcy
protection).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006) (listing the requirements that allow a party of interest, “after
notice and a hearing,” to petition the court for conversion of the case to a chapter 7 liquidation).
112. See In re 15375 Memorial Corp., 400 B.R. 420, 427 (D. Del. 2009) (“preserving a going
concern” or “maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate” are goals of filing for bankruptcy
protection) (citation omitted).
113. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 21; Miller & Waisman, supra note 21; Paul N. Silverstein &
Harold Jones, The Evolving Role of Bankruptcy Judges Under the Bankruptcy Code, 51 BROOK.
L. REV. 555 (1985).
114. See generally Miller & Waisman, supra note 21 (discussing the many obstacles that have
entered the reorganization plan confirmation process, including strategic objections, employee and
key vendor benefits and greater costs).
115. See generally id. Greater sophistication by creditors and an increasingly service based
economy has turned the Chapter 11 landscape into a more contentious process that may no longer
yield the “going concern” premium that formerly existed in the railroad bankruptcies. See id. at
182 (“[D]istressed debt traders' entry into the reorganization paradigm has transformed Chapter 11
reorganizations from primarily rehabilitative processes to dual-purpose processes that stress
maximum enhancement of creditor recovery in addition to rehabilitation of the debtor entity.”).
116. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-In-Possession
Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905 (2004) (describing the history and current use of “DIP
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which may be unavailable or only available at a substantial rate.117 The sale,
it is argued, provides a level of certainty that a plan confirmation cannot: it
ensures that a level of assets that will be split among creditors and obviates
the need for a time-consuming and expensive valuation finding during plan
confirmation.118 Creditors also need not focus on the workings of the
business or fear that the business will leak losses, implode, and require
liquidation.119 The sale of the assets, if performed correctly, would also
likely yield a more reliable price than expert valuations presented to a
bankruptcy judge,120 a result in line with the Code’s policy of preferring
market valuation when possible.121
financing”). DIP financing refers to financing made available to a debtor during the course of its
bankruptcy proceedings in order to finance the ongoing restructuring as well as a viable
reorganization. See generally id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006) (providing courts with power to
approve financing for the debtor in possession).
117. See Lee, supra note 21, at 546. A quick sale of assets may be necessary where a business
runs out of cash collateral financing and DIP financing is unavailable. See id.
118. See George W. Kuney, Let's Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as
an Alternative Exit From Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2004) (“[T]he insolvency
community has embraced the nonplan sale of substantially all the assets of a debtor's business as
an efficient alternative to the costly and lengthy plan confirmation process.”) (internal citations
omitted). 363(b) sales secure a price for a firm’s assets and allow creditors to focus on achieving a
plan to distribute assets. See id.
Further, by reducing the assets of the estate to cash, a note secured by the assets sold,
the stock of the purchaser, or some other similar form of fungible valuable
consideration, the tasks and costs of postsale management and administration of a
debtor and its estate can be dramatically reduced.
Id. at 1270–71 (internal citations omitted). This will reduce monitoring cost as the creditors no
longer must analyze market conditions or the managerial decisions of the debtor. See id.
In turn, this allows for a reduction in the amount of a debtor's value that is redistributed
from prepetition creditors to postpetition administrative claimants as a case drags on. It
takes little in the way of a management team to preside over an estate comprised solely
of liquid assets.
Id. at 1271 (internal citations omitted).
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006) (requiring that a company that is unable to emerge from
chapter 11 as a viable entity will either be converted to chapter 7 liquidation or the bankruptcy
case will be dismissed).
120. See Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in
Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83, 90 (2001) (“Not only do judges lack the business expertise of
individual capital investors, but also a judicial valuation cannot benefit from the collective
wisdom of market investors in the aggregate. As a result, even unbiased judges make mistakes that
a market process would not permit.”). An open and populated market should yield efficient
outcomes, demonstrating the true value of the asset. See Oversight of TARP Assistance to the
Automobile Industry: Field Hearing Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 97–
108 (2009) (statement of Barry E. Adler, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law)
(advocating putting all large § 363(b) sales through a stringent market test to ensure fair price and
prevent abuses) [hereinafter Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum].
121. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 373 B.R. 283, 293 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he
public trading market constitutes an impartial gauge of investor confidence and remains the best
and most unbiased measure of fair market value and, when available to the Court, is the preferred
standard of valuation.”) (citing VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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Looking at these benefits—including shorter time in bankruptcy,
certainty, fewer resources used—as a whole, it may be difficult to dispute
the use of these sales procedures. In fact, some academics believe that the §
363(b) sale is the future of bankruptcy and that few if any large
bankruptcies benefit from a drawn out confirmation plan.122 Others, while
not ruling out the usefulness of the plan confirmation process, contend that
the process is no longer viable for large distressed businesses and that,
absent major revisions to the Code, the § 363(b) sale may be, in certain
circumstances, a useful and prudent solution.123
While there is major support for the use of § 363(b) sales, there are
critics who argue that the procedure is fraught with possibilities for abuse
and enables parties to effectuate sweetheart deals.124 These critics argue that
the use of § 363(b) sales increases the ability of insiders to engage in selfdealing, given the lighter scrutiny to which the sales are subjected.125 They
argue further that benefits to insiders such as continued employment,
assignment of liability, and even payment may be provided by the
purchaser in exchange for the debtor supporting and obtaining approval of
the sale, and that this may be particularly true in § 363(b) sales in which a
parent company or former equity holders acquire the business.126
Imperfections in valuation and the auction procedures used by various
bankruptcy courts may allow a creditor or third party to purchase a business
at well below value.127 Commentators argue that because insiders do not
usually gain in the distribution of assets, it may be worthwhile for them to
sell to a third party at below market value while receiving an outside
benefit, such as those described in the previous paragraph.128 Further, if the
debtor has special knowledge about the business and is in the best position
to value the company, she may also be in the best position to argue for a
low valuation and provide the benefit to a purchaser at the cost of
creditors.129 Commentators have responded differently to this problem of
valuation. Some have responded by arguing for a market test, whereby
market forces will dictate the fair price for the asset and prevent abuses that
stem from undervaluation.130 Other commentators argue that a market test
122.
123.
124.
125.

See, e.g., Lee, supra note 21, at 562.
See Miller & Waisman, supra note 21, at 199–200.
See generally Rose, supra note 22.
See id. at 277–80 (arguing that the debtor in possession may have conflicts of interest that
encourage selling to insiders or affiliated companies and may yield deals that provide a windfall
for third parties at the expense of creditors).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 277–78 (discussing how manipulation of valuations and auction procedures can
lead to depressed pricing).
128. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 30–31.
129. See Rose, supra note 22, at 277–78 (describing how insiders profited when Polaroid was
sold for $465 million despite $1.8 billion in assets).
130. See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120 (discussing how open
auctions will reveal when parties are receiving unduly favorable terms).
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cannot cure the abuses and inappropriate outcomes that flow from the speed
and absence of disclosure in § 363(b) sales.131
There also exists the possibility that a § 363(b) sale will be used to
effectuate a sub rosa plan in which the purchaser can gain significant
returns at the expense of other creditors.132 As part of a sale, ownership of
the traded asset may be distributed; in General Motors, for example, both
the employee pension fund and the union received significant portions of
the new company without a commensurate contribution of capital.133
Although such transactions meet the technical definition of a sub rosa plan,
they are not always labeled as such, effectively allowing the debtor to
distribute assets without complying with the plan confirmation
requirements of § 1129 of the Code.134 Commentators have been especially
wary of these kinds of sales, as creditors will not only lose in their payout
but are also locked out of the process.135
Those opposing the current proliferation of § 363(b) sales do not
necessarily contest its use in all circumstances or deny its appeal; instead,
they argue for increased procedural safeguards or limitations.136 They claim
that these procedures should be subject to a more stringent inquiry into
whether the plan does, in fact, constitute a sub rosa plan bypassing the
safeguards of a plan confirmation process.137 Additionally, some
commentators argue for a market test for § 363(b) sales so as to ensure that
insiders are not effecting “sweetheart deals,”138 whereas others argue for a
heightened “business justification” standard.139 These concerns highlight
the procedural disadvantages of § 363(b) sales despite acknowledging the
great benefits that may accrue from their use. From this, it becomes clear
that availability of § 363(b) sales procedures should be preserved—and
possibly encouraged—but that precautions must be taken to prevent the
types of abuses to which they are currently susceptible.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This note has focused on two areas of abuse that exist in § 363(b) sales:
1) the ability of insiders or other parties to purchase the company at below
131.
132.
133.
134.

See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 40–45.
See Sloane, supra note 22, at 60–63.
In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 482–83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Sloane, supra note 22, at 51 (discussing how decisions applying Braniff have generally
allowed § 363(b) sales to go through, which alleviates the debtor’s need to make disclosure or
gather consenting creditor votes).
135. See id. at 62.
136. See, e.g., Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 106–08; LoPucki &
Doherty, supra note 22, at 44–45; Rose, supra note 22, at 283–84.
137. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 62.
138. See Automotive Field Hearings, supra note 120 (advocating for a true market test to ensure
that sale value is maximized and that the sale does not deprive creditors’ of the safeguards that the
Bankruptcy Code provides them).
139. See Rose, supra note 22, at 283–84.
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market value; and 2) the ability of the debtor or insiders to compel a sale in
order to secure a benefit for themselves at the expense of creditors. These
abuses can be significantly reduced by employing a robust market test that
includes disclosure of all terms of the sale, adequate time for bidders to
respond, and a centralized forum to receive—and notify all affected parties
of—purchase bids.140
Additionally, where a quick sale is required and a meaningful market
test cannot be implemented, the standard for justifying the sale should be
heightened.141 These changes will provide fairness and credibility, and will
limit uses of § 363(b) sales to subvert the Code’s protection of creditors.142
A. A ROBUST MARKET TEST
Academics and practitioners have proposed that § 363(b) sales should
require a market test to ensure that the price paid for assets in the sale is
fair, and to provide interested bidders with a forum to purchase the
property.143 Proponents of a market test argue that it provides safeguards
necessary to ensure fairness and prevent abuse.144 First—assuming the
existence of an efficient and populated market—arbitrageurs, speculators,
and other participants should theoretically raise the company’s value to its
“market price.”145 This would prevent insiders from colluding with a
purchaser to sell the company at an artificially low price in exchange for
side benefit.146 Similarly, the market test may attract purchasers who can
significantly raise the returns of the company, possibly through synergies or
economies of scale.147 If details of the sale are made public and scrutinized,
140. See generally Adler, supra note 14, at 317–18 (proposing the “sort of process that state law
would provide shareholders of a solvent firm”).
141. See Rose, supra note 22, at 283 (“The complexities of a § 363 sale require intensified
scrutiny because of the dangers of debtor manipulation of market forces.”).
142. See discussion supra Part II.A (detailing the protections afforded to creditors in a
bankruptcy plan reorganization).
143. See generally Rachael M. Jackson, Note, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a
Post-Enron World: Trusting the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 451; see also, Rose, supra note 22.
144. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 786–88 (2002); Lee, supra note 21, at 536–37.
145. See Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 942
(2002) (“The fair market value of an asset is generally defined as the price at which the asset
would change hands in a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller when neither is
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both are reasonably informed.”).
146. See id. at 947 (acknowledging that a price below fair value will attract other purchasers).
147. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 598, 608
(1989).
An important source of potential gain from takeovers is synergy between buyer and
seller that permits the merged company to be run more efficiently. Three sources of
synergy can be distinguished: (i) operating synergy resulting from economies of scale
or scope; (ii) improved management of the target; and (iii) financial or managerial
synergy due to more efficient use of capital or management talent.
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proponents of the sale will, in theory, be deterred from engaging in fraud or
side deals. Thus, the market test may also provide a level of certainty and
fairness simply from its procedure.148
This model of market arbitrage and an effective market test may be
criticized as simple and overly optimistic as it assumes a populated market,
low transaction costs, and complete information.149 Although such
conditions, or even conditions approaching these, are unlikely, bankruptcy
courts may foster a more favorable environment for bidders to produce a
populated auction and thereby increase possible revenue.150 To emulate
such optimal market conditions, a robust effective market test should
require: 1) full disclosure of proposed bids; 2) adequate time to respond to
the bids by all parties and purchasers; and 3) creditor and judicial review of
competing bids.
1. FULL DISCLOSURE OF SALE TERMS
A debtor loses many privacy protections that it had outside of
bankruptcy, including required post-petition disclosure when proposing the
confirmation plan.151 Also, a debtor is required to accept better bids, if
offered, in a § 363(b) sale.152 However, these alone may be insufficient to
ensure an effective market test.
Under the current regime, the complete details of a sale are not always
provided, made public, or even available.153 While requiring a purchasing
company to reveal all elements of its purchase and act as a “stalking horse”
may be harsh, the protections that the bankruptcy sale will provide them—
including the ability to purchase “free and clear” of encumbrances154 and
the limited appealability of § 363(b) sales155—should make for a fair
Id.

148. See Rose, supra note 22, at 277–83.
149. See Fischel, supra note 145, at 944–47 (discussing unrealistic assumptions underlying
analysis of fair market price).
150. See generally Steven B. Katz, Note, Designing and Executing a “Fair” Revlon Auction,
17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 183 (1989) (“[I]ncreasing the number of bidders in an auction
increases the probability of a particular bidder having the highest valuation, thereby usually
raising the seller's revenue.”).
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
152. See In re Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 285 B.R. 497, 517 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing
In re Lionel, 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983)) (“In a liquidation case it is ‘legally essential’ to
approve the highest offer . . . .”); see generally Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (requiring the Board of Directors, in a sale of control context, to
maximize shareholder’s equity).
153. See Rose, supra note 22, at 260 (“With a § 363 sale, fewer people receive less information,
and the lack of a disclosure requirement weakens creditor leverage . . . .”).
154. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006).
155. Id. § 363(m).
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease
under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good
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tradeoff. By making details of the transaction and proposals public,
potential purchasers will be able to assess the fairness of current proposals,
and may outbid current offers that undervalue the company, in an attempt to
receive a profit.156
Additionally, companies do not necessarily submit bids that only differ
in price or in a limited number of provisions; quite the opposite, bids for
distressed companies often vary widely.157 One purchaser may provide a
higher price but will dismantle the company for its assets and consumer
base,158 while another plan may infuse capital and expertise into expanding
the business but at a lower price.159 Depending on the particular
circumstances of the distressed business, either plan may prove to be a
better solution for the creditors and for the public at large.
Only by making full disclosure of the bids submitted can interested and
official parties effectively evaluate which of multiple proposals to accept.160
Increasing the availability of information will serve two purposes for
potential purchasers. First, it will lower transaction costs to bidders,
enabling them to base their offers on a better evaluation of the company.161
Second, because an offer will serve as an indicator of the selling company’s
value,162 hesitant market participants may be reassured of the soundness of
an investment in the company, thus increasing the likelihood of a
competitive auction.163

faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such
authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.
Id.

156. See generally Katz, supra note 150, at 184–85 (describing “Revlon” type auctions where
“[b]y increasing his bid, the bidder decreases his potential profit, but increases his probability of
winning. . . . [which forces the bidder to] close the gap between his bid and his honest valuation”).
157. Compare In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving
a sale of a business for ownership and infusion of capital and expertise in a transaction between
Fiat and Chrysler); with In re Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (approving a straight
sale of a business entity for cash or its equivalent).
158. See, e.g., Enron, 291 B.R. at 40 (approving the sale of Enron Wind Corp., a subsidiary of
Enron Corp., to General Electric Co. for a combination of cash and assumption of liabilities).
159. See, e.g., Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 96 (approving the sale following consideration the
synergies that Fiat could provide Chrysler, including new technologies and an international
network, in ordering the § 363(b) sale).
160. Theodore N. Mirvis & Andrew J. Nussbaum, Mergers and Acquisitions and Takeover
Preparedness, 907 PLI/CORP. HANDBOOK SERIES 501, 536–37(1995) (the board of directors in a
change of control context must analyze all factors of a bid including price, feasibility and identity
of the bidder in calculating the “best value” for its shareholders).
161. See generally David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the
Trading of Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REV. 967, 985–86 (1991).
162. See generally id.
163. See Katz, supra note 150, at 187–88 (“[An] advantage of the seller publicizing information
is that the cost of preparing a bid is lowered. Lower bid preparation costs may entice additional
bidders to enter the auction, thereby creating a more competitive auction and increasing the seller's
expected return.”).
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Full disclosure would also reveal and deter fraud or insider dealing as it
does in federal securities law.164 There are three categories of entities that
have an incentive to find self-dealing, fraud, or other problems in the plan.
Official entities, such as the court or a United States trustee, will be
attentive to these problems as part of their official duty.165 Second, creditors
that stand to be impaired by the sale have the incentive to scrutinize and
oppose it for such imperfections.166 Finally, competing purchasers are also
in a position to analyze the plan for faults and may profit by outbidding for
what they deem to be an undervalued asset.167 Full disclosure will provide
all of these parties the means to analyze bids and ferret out abuse.
Requiring the parties proposing a § 363(b) sale to make full disclosure
should encourage market participants to bid on the asset in question.168
Competitive bids such as these are more likely to result in a fair market
valuation of the sale asset.169 Ultimately, disclosure is beneficial because it
disincentivizes the proposing parties from engaging in fraud, self-dealing,
or other abuses that they would not want exposed to the public.
2. ADEQUATE TIME FOR MARKET PLAYERS TO
RESPOND TO THE SALE.
In addition to requiring disclosure of the details of the § 363(b) sales,
the court should provide sufficient time to market players to respond to the
test and bid on the company. In order for a market test to reveal whether a
price is fair or if other purchasers can provide better terms, there needs to be
a sufficient opportunity for bidders to research, plan, and draft competing
proposals.170 Potential purchasers must be provided with enough time to
formulate bids and be assured that their bids will be given proper

164. See generally Richard E. Mendales, Looking Under the Rock: Disclosure of Bankruptcy
Issues Under the Securities Laws, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 738–39 (1996) (explaining how
disclosure in securities law serves a regulatory purpose allowing interested private parties to
monitor themselves).
165. U.S. Trustee Program, Strategic Plan & Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/mission.htm (“The USTP's mission is to promote integrity
and efficiency in the nation’s bankruptcy system by enforcing bankruptcy laws, providing
oversight of private trustees, and maintaining operational excellence.”).
166. See Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46
S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1172–73 (1995) (arguing that “impaired debtors who receive less than
reasonably equivalent value may unfairly or improperly harm creditors even when the debtor did
not have intention to cause harm to its creditors[,]” thereby incentivizing creditors to scrutinize
debtor activities).
167. See generally Katz, supra note 150, at 181–88.
168. See id. at 187.
169. See id.
170. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 25–26, 41–42 (finding that there were
significant costs, in the range of $5 million, in formulating a bid in a § 363(b) sale and recovery
rates in such sales increased with the length of the market test).
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attention.171 A sale that does not provide sufficient time for market players
to respond to proposals will be ineffective and merely pro forma.172
To ensure that adequate notice for market participation exists, the court
can publish the terms of the sale and an invitation for competing bids. This
type of publication should be tailored to the target audience and costs can
vary with the value of the asset being sold.173 Thus, while taking out a
newspaper ad for a large corporation—such as General Motors or
Chrysler—is worthwhile, it would be unreasonable to require it for a small
asset, as the cost of publication would significantly reduce payouts to
creditors.174
This notice should provide a timeline in which offers will be accepted
and evaluated.175 The period must be clear as the parties that will expend
resources on preparing and submitting a bid will need assurance that their
bids will be adequately reviewed and considered against the current sale
agreement.176
It is reasonable for investors to be wary of participating in a market test.
The drafters of the sale may argue that losing their initial agreement may
cause uncertainty, and that subsequent bids may change terms that have
already been considered and accepted.177 However, for the market test to be
effective, new bids must be evaluated on equal footing with the proposed
agreement.178 A period in which all proposals are considered—along with
the requirement that bids be considered by both the court and impaired
creditors179—is a proper solution to this problem because it ensures that if a
new and better offer is proposed with a reasonable time frame, it may
replace the agreed upon sale.

171. See id. at 26 (finding that although “the recovery ratio for a reorganized company
decreases with time in bankruptcy[,] . . . the recovery ratio of a sold company increases with time
in bankruptcy”).
172. Publication and adequate time to formulate a bid are factors that should foster greater
bidder participation in order to maximize price. See generally Katz, supra note 150, at 183, 187.
173. See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 107 (proposing that
auction procedures should not apply to small businesses as they would be unable to recoup the
costs).
174. See id. (arguing that publication of terms and market tests may not be feasible for smaller
assets).
175. But see id.
176. Proponents of a § 363(b) sale are however reluctant to entertain competing offers and stifle
true bidding through selecting a “stalking horse” and implementing short bidding periods once the
“stalking horse” has been selected. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 35–36.
177. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV.
727, 747–51 (2010) (describing the bidding process in Chrysler and how there was a requirement
that new bids be approved by multiple committees and conform to standards enacted by the
proponent, which demonstrates a sale proponent’s desire to consummate an existing offer so as
not to lose its proverbial “bird in the hand”).
178. See Katz, supra note 150, at 175 (arguing that sellers need to be committed to the auction
process for bidders to put forth their best offers).
179. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
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Finally, the adequate time provision must give investors sufficient time
to formulate and propose a competing bid.180 The amount of time necessary
should depend on the size of the asset, current market conditions, liquidity
of the asset, and prior shopping for purchasers, among other factors.181 For
example, a large asset such as an automotive manufacturer may require that
purchasing companies seek outside funding, thus raising the time necessary
to form a bid. Similarly, in tight capital conditions, such as those of the
current economy, bidders may require more time to secure the capital for
the purchase. A court implementing a market test must be cognizant of
these factors to ensure that the market test is an effective one.
3. CREDITOR AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMPETING
BIDS
A third requirement that will provide for an effective market test is
review of competing bids by the court and by impaired creditors. This
requirement is important because: 1) it will provide for impartial review of
bids that benefit creditors as a class and incentivize the bidding process;182
2) it will deter insiders from proposing “sweetheart” or self-interested
deals;183 and 3) it will create a centralized forum to receive and evaluate
bids.
The first benefit of requiring review by parties other than the proponent
of the § 363(b) sale184 is that potential bidders will have more confidence
that their bids will be reviewed and that their diligence will not go to
waste.185 As with the adequate time provision, this element facilitates the
environment necessary for a competitive bidding process.186
180. See Warburton, supra note 13, at 567.
363 sales proceeded at an unnecessarily fast pace. The bankruptcy courts in each case
required that any competing bid be submitted within a matter of days. Critics cite the
short amount of time permitted for competing 363 bids as an additional constraint
imposed on the bidding process. In other words, the speed of the process purportedly
discouraged the submission of competing bids, impeding a true market valuation of the
assets.
Id.

181. See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 107 (advocating for
market test to conform to state law requirements and provide bidders with adequate time to
formulate their bids).
182. See Katz, supra note 150, at 178 (describing how bidders will be disincentivized from
participating in an auction if there is a significant risk that their bid will fail).
183. See Rose, supra note 22, at 272–83.
184. This could include either the creditors, perhaps through a committee of unsecured
creditors, or by the court.
185. See generally Robert U. Sattin, Finality in Auction Sales: It Ain't Over Till It's Over, 23
AM. BANKR. INST. J., 52, 53 (2004) (describing the finality of auctions as a necessary element that
ensures that bidders are confident that their bids will receive due consideration and will not be
upset by subsequent events); see also generally Katz, supra note 150.
186. See generally Katz, supra note 150 (creating an auction that entices bidders will draw
more bidders and in turn increase the probability of obtaining a higher bid price).
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The second benefit of third party review of competing bids is that it
should deter proponents from proposing plans with an unfairly low price or
that retain benefits to themselves.187 If a party realizes that its attempt at
deceiving the system will likely be caught, it is less likely to engage in the
devious conduct.188
The test will also provide a centralized forum for the receipt of bids,
affording some measure of assurance and cost savings to bidding parties.189
Although not as significant as the other elements described, requiring
creditors and the court to consider all bids will provide an auction
atmosphere in which parties may compete with each other in the open. This
will ensure that the debtor cannot unfairly discriminate among purchasers
and will also lower the transaction costs for bidding parties of obtaining
information.190 Finally, and optimistically, such a centralized forum may
facilitate a bidding war that will increase the purchase price to the benefit of
all creditors.191
The elements of the robust market test are designed to mimic a
competitive market and provide the protections similar to those of a
reorganization plan confirmation. They are also meant to ensure a proper
review of the sale, and to give outsiders and creditors leverage over a selfinterested sale proponent as well as provide them with more satisfaction
from the process.
4. A ROBUST MARKET TEST CAN BE EFFECTIVE
Some current commentary contends that market sales are either
ineffective, difficult to implement, cost prohibitive, or some combination of
all three.192 While it is not argued that the steps outlined above will provide
an optimal solution, this note’s proposal takes these arguments into account.
It is conceded that a market test may not be possible under all
circumstances, nor is it feasible that all market tests should be equally

187. See generally LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22 (discussing the side dealings and abuses
that occur in an undervalued § 363(b) sale); see also Rose, supra note 22.
188. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176–78 (1968) (outlining the deterrence effect and arguing that criminals take costs of
their actions into account when committing crimes, that costs are measured by the sanction for the
act, and are multiplied by the chance of being caught). Under the deterrence theory, raising either
the sanction or the probability of being caught makes the action less valuable and hence deters a
potential actor from engaging in the act. Id.
189. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he high costs of evaluating companies,
combined with the low probability of success for competing bidders, discourages competitive
bids.”).
190. See Katz, supra note 150, at 187–88.
191. See id. at 183.
192. See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 41–45 (reporting results from a study of
recent § 363(b) sales that yielded results that found that sales undervalue the company as
compared to a plan reorganization and failed to bring in competing bids).
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stringent.193 The type and duration of the market test, the form of marketing
devices to be used, and the choice between a formal bidding process and an
auction, should all be determined on a case-by-case basis.194
Criticisms that a market test would prove ineffective are based on faults
with the procedures currently in use, not with the market test concept
itself.195 It has been argued that market tests fail to bring in bidders and do
little to no good in raising § 363(b) sale prices or deterring abuse.196
However, the three elements of the proposed robust market test would
alleviate such problems. First, requiring greater disclosure would give
potential bidders greater access to the information they need to formulate a
bid that they believe will be successful.197 Second, an adequate period of
time would allow more players to enter the bidding process and provide
them with more incentive to prepare and submit bids.198 Third, an impartial
weighing of bids would provide outside bidders a greater opportunity to
present their case and have their bids considered.199 While this may not
entirely eliminate the problems of the current § 363(b) market test, they will
make the market tests more effective and provide greater certainty as to
adequacy of price while deterring abuse.
B. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF THE “TIME IS OF THE
ESSENCE” SALE
One important and controversial justification for the use of § 363(b)
sales and their quick implementation is the “time is of the essence”
rationale.200 This justification relies on an extrinsic factor—usually a backout date in a sale agreement—to require the quick ordering of a sale before
the purchaser pulls out and/or the business implodes.201 Both the Chrysler
and General Motors cases employed this justification for their expedited

193. See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 107.
194. See id. A market test must be tailored to the asset being sold as well as the prospective
market. See id. Particularly, the cost of the auction must not be so large in comparison with
projected proceeds as to make the auction unreasonable. See id.
195. See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 41 (debtors often offer bid incentives to
the stalking horse making subsequent offers harder to obtain); Rose, supra note 22, at 282 (“The
market cannot correct deal protection fees, credit bidding, and disparity in bidders' information.
Additionally, the debtor's ability to limit participants even with open auctions makes the courts'
use of market exposure as an objective standard insufficient as well.”).
196. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 41–42.
197. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
198. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
199. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
200. See, e.g., In re Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 120 B.R. 301, 307 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
201. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re
Titusville Country Club, 128 B.R. 396, 397 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); Equity Funding Corp. of Am.
v. Financial Assocs., 492 F.2d 793, 793 (9th Cir. 1974).
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sales202 and it has been established as a valid justification in a variety of
circumstances.203
“Time is of the essence” has been criticized by certain academics. One
argument against the justification is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the purchaser will actually back out of the deal204 or if
the back-out date is being used to subvert the bankruptcy process and avoid
scrutiny.205 Another argument is that it provides perverse incentives to the
management of an ailing business to only declare bankruptcy when a “drop
dead date” is imminent and the business is unable to withstand a lengthy
bankruptcy.206
A solution must deter purchasers from abusing the bankruptcy system
while providing the court with the flexibility needed to address novel and
drastic situations. Because a quick sale will preclude an effective market
test and the safeguards that the test ensures, courts should require the
proponents of a “time is of the essence” § 363(b) sale to face heightened
scrutiny.207 Those invoking the justification should be required to provide
compelling reason for the necessity of the sale and the deadline. The court
should also analyze the substance of deals for insider benefit and selfdealing.208 Further, because the market test and this heightened scrutiny are
designed to combat abuse, the court may lower the level of scrutiny
involved where time for a market test is provided, even though truncated,
while heightening scrutiny of sales with imminent sale dates.

202. See In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 96–97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(considering the timeline set out by Fiat for the Chrysler merger in ordering the sale); General
Motors, 407 B.R. at 480 (considering the United State Government’s requirement that the sale be
consummated quickly as justification for ordering the sale).
203. See, e.g., In re Thomson McKinnon, 120 B.R. at 307.
Time is of the essence because the contracts with the key employees will expire by
January 2, 1991, whereas the trustees of the Funds have threatened to terminate their
arrangements with the Partnership if a prospective purchaser is not promptly approved
who could offer investment management services which would meet with their
approval.
Id.; In re Oneida Lake, Inc., 114 B.R. 352, 355–57 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990) (ordering a sale based
on rapidly decreasing market value and an open sale, despite not using “time of the essence”
language).
204. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 60–61.
205. See id. (arguing that expedited sales procedures may be used to disenfranchise creditor
voting and “short circuit” bankruptcy safeguards).
206. See General Motors, 407 B.R. at 480; see also LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 37
(discussing the probable effect of a drop dead date on the sale price).
207. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 177, at 749 (noting that the bidding process in Chrysler
occurred in a little more than a week, giving bidders insufficient time to perform due diligence or
obtain financing, thereby circumventing the protection that the market test is intended to provide).
208. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 22, at 280–83 (discussing the ability of the debtor to circumvent
an effective market test and to distort valuation requiring “intensified scrutiny”).
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1. THE NECESSITY OF THE SALE/DEADLINE ANALYSIS
Courts, following Lionel, require the proponent of a § 363(b) sale to
provide “good business justification” for implementing the sale.209 In “time
is of the essence” cases, the need to effect a sale before the termination date
of purchase contract along with a showing that the sale is in the best
interests of the creditors has been sustained as sufficiently good
justifications for the § 363(b) sale.210 This analysis requires that the sale
provide at least as much as to creditors as a liquidation of the company’s
assets.211 Further, it must be shown that it is unlikely that a market test
would fetch a higher price for the company.212 Courts also require that the
sale be necessary, either by showing that the company will be unable to
secure financing to fund its bankruptcy213 or that the company is wasting
away in the bankruptcy process.214
When a “time is of the essence” justification is used, courts may lower
the scrutiny given to the factors provided in Lionel.215 The need to
implement a sale while there is a willing purchaser may pressure the parties
or the court to accept a sale.216 Further, due to the speed of many § 363(b)
sales, full inquiry into the facts of the bankruptcy or the terms of the sale
may not be possible.217 For these reasons, parties may invoke the
justification so their agreement will be subject to more relaxed review and
the sale will be more likely to proceed.
Research has shown that unsecured creditors and equity holders are
often placed in a worse position in a § 363(b) sale than they would be in a
plan confirmation.218 At the same time secured creditors and priority
creditors are often placed in a superior position, possibly due to their
involvement in the drafting of the sale agreement and also due to the money
saved by averting a drawn out bankruptcy.219 Because of the quick timeline,
209. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
210. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(discussing how proponents of the sale made a showing that the sale was necessary for the
preservation of the estate, that no other purchasers were available even after extensive search and
that the creditors were receiving a large portion of the distribution just like in a liquidation).
211. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(7)(A)(ii) (2006).
212. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. 84 (showing was made that there was an extensive search made
for purchasers and only Fiat was willing to be involved); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R.
463, 480–81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (showing was made that there were no other purchasers
available and willing to acquire the company).
213. See, e.g., Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 480.
214. See, e.g., Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071.
215. See Rose, supra note 22, at 270–71 (“[T]he court is reluctant to scrutinize quick
transactions since a denial would risk irreparable diminished payouts to creditors.”).
216. See id. at 271.
217. See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code 363(f) and Undermining the
Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 279–80 (2002).
218. See id. at 275–80 (indicating that secured and priority creditors benefit from expedited
sales while other creditors are placed at a disadvantage).
219. See id.
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limited access to information, and lack of involvement in the drafting of the
sale, it is questionable whether impaired parties can meaningfully object in
a “time is of the essence” § 363(b) sale hearing.220
The other major problem with a “time is of the essence” sale is that it
precludes an effective market test.221 Where urgency is present, market
participants either cannot formulate a bid or their offers will be rejected to
maintain a current secured offer.222
“Time is of the essence” sales are appealing for the purchasing party
because of this limited scrutiny and likely sale.223 However, the sale is
susceptible to abuse and increases the likelihood of “sweetheart” deals
accruing unfair benefits to the purchaser and insiders.224 A requirement that
the proponent of a “time is of the essence” sale show a compelling necessity
is needed to counteract the lack of a market test and limited ability of
creditors to object;225 the need for a quick sale should heighten scrutiny not
diminish it.
Courts should inquire into the efforts made to sell the company and
require disclosure of any offers for its purchase. This will be necessary to
not only analyze whether better offers are available but also what actions
were taken to sell the company and whether future offers are likely.226 If the
“drop dead date” is sufficiently far in the future, the market test should
supplement this showing. To make this showing, the proponent should
show that the debtor engaged in bidder shopping and establish that despite
the special privileges of § 363(b), a new purchaser would not come forward.
Review of the reason for the impending deadline, while not
dispositively establishing the credibility of the threat, may reveal an attempt
to subvert the system.227 If a “drop dead date” does not relate to a valid
business reason, the court should engage in or strengthen the substantive
review of the sale.

220.
221.
222.
223.

See Rose, supra note 22, at 260.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (vacating sale order of
Bankruptcy Court because it failed to adequately scrutinize the sales procedure and relied on the
“debtors' business judgment”).
224. See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 108–09
(2004).
225. See Rose, supra note 22, at 284 (analyzing the shortened timeframe and limited disclosure
in § 363(b) sales that hinder the ability of creditors to effectively object to the sale).
226. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(considering whether Chrysler was in discussions and negotiations for an alliance with multiple
manufacturers).
227. See Rose, supra note 22, at 280 (analyzing how debtor’s claim in Polaroid case received
the “maximum value” from the initial bid and that bidding should have been closed was debunked
by subsequent bids for nearly twice the value, thereby indicating possible insider and unfair
dealings).
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2. INDEPENDENT COURT REVIEW FOR FRAUD AND
SELF-DEALING
In “time is of the essence” § 363(b) sales, review by creditors is limited,
full disclosure is ineffective or impossible, and a market test is effectively
avoided.228 As such, procedural impediments to abuse are rendered
ineffective. In order to instill credibility and deter abuse, the sale agreement
must be subject to review by the courts; this provides a reasonable, though
imperfect, substitute for a market test.229
The court or the United States trustee should independently review
“time is of the essence” sales to ensure against fraud. Finding that the terms
are fair and not the product of abuse will prevent insiders selling to the
purchaser for below market value in return for side benefits.230 The mere
fact of the review may also deter parties from engaging in side dealing or
“sweetheart deals” because the court will be aware of and look for such
favorable terms.
First, in much the same way that disclosure requirements in areas such
as securities law deter fraud and self-dealing, court review should deter
proponents of § 363(b) sales from engaging in abuse.231 This “substantive
fairness”232 review will not likely affect results that are at the margin of
reasonable purchases, but it may reveal abuse in egregious cases.
Second, the substantive review may provide insight into the bidding
process and increase the likelihood that another purchaser will come
forward.233 This information can be evaluated along with the record
provided by the § 363(b) proceedings to supplement an analysis of the
sale’s necessity. If a plan seems “too good to be true,” the court may require
the sale to be pushed back and a market test ordered.

228. See discussion Part III.B (discussing how shortened time frame of “time is of the essence”
sales precludes meaningful opposition).
229. Courts have, on occasion, instituted substantive review of § 363(b) sales to ensure against
self dealing, undervaluation and other abuses. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 41–43
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 552–54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1997) (finding that leveraged buyout agreement could not be approved due to conflicts of interest,
self-dealing, and improper bidding procedures).
230. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 32–33 (finding that in eleven out of thirty
studied reorganizations, the CEO of the selling company was able to secure a side benefit, such as
severance payments, continued employment or a paid consulting position).
231. See generally Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 808–09 (2001) (discussing disclosure requirements
that facilitate discovery, review, and regulation of self-dealing transactions).
232. See id. (discussing how in securities regulation, review by independent parties such as
independent corporate directors, regulators, and judges deters self-dealing and illicit transactions
and promotes correction through channels such as shareholder derivative suits).
233. See Rose, supra note 22, at 281–82 (discussing how the ability of debtors or purchasers to
manipulate market forces through deal protection fees, limited release of information, and limited
bidder participation requires judicial oversight to ensure proper valuation of assets).
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While such review cannot replace a market test, this heightened
scrutiny will facilitate the bankruptcy judge’s power in such emergency
situations to prevent or at least limit abuse.
CONCLUSION
The Chrysler and General Motors cases indicate that the use of §
363(b) sales is important and relevant.234 The impact of these sales will be
felt widely in bankruptcy proceedings, out-of-court workouts, and in
corporate meetings throughout America.235
Commercial transactions operate in the “shadow of the law”236 and
remains unclear what impact the automotive bankruptcies will have on
commercial decisions in the future. However, lenders—such as those that
were negatively impacted by the two companies filing for bankruptcy and
resorting to § 363(b) sales—are vital to a thriving economy;237 they take
into account the risks associated with businesses filing for bankruptcy and
allocate future capital accordingly.238 Even assuming that creditors in the
General Motors and Chrysler cases were provided with as large of a payout
as they would have received in a plan confirmation, their loss of control
over the process may have had a negative impact on lenders generally and
may chill lending to distressed or even healthy businesses.239 This, coupled
with concerns over abuse, fraud, and self-dealing, provides a compelling
reason to safeguard creditors and curtail the use of § 363(b) sales.240

234. See Adler, supra note 14, at 305–06 (discussing the precedential impact of the Chrysler
and General Motors cases).
235. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 177, at 770 (“The unevenness of the compensation to prior
creditors [in Chrysler] raised considerable concerns in capital markets.”).
236. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing divorce law, providing an in
depth analysis of the effect of laws on private decisions, and detailing the phenomenon of society
functioning in the “shadow of the law”).
237. Barack H. Obama, President, United States, Remarks to Joint Session of Congress (Feb.
24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-ObamaAddress-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress.
[T]he flow of credit is the lifeblood of our economy. The ability to get a loan is how
you finance the purchase of everything from a home to a car to a college education;
how stores stock their shelves, farms buy equipment, and businesses make payroll. . . .
When there is no lending, families can’t afford to buy homes or cars. So businesses are
forced to make layoffs. Our economy suffers even more, and credit dries up even
further.
Id.

238. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of
Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679 (1998).
239. See Adler, supra note 14, at 311 (“[W]hen the bankruptcy process deprives a creditor of its
promised return, the prospect of a debtor's failure looms larger in the eyes of future lenders to
future firms.”).
240. See Rose, supra note 22, at 284.
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On the other hand, § 363(b) sales provide undeniable benefits to
struggling businesses and their stakeholders.241 A solution that combines
these benefits—such as speed and efficiency—with the plan confirmation’s
democratic protections can improve the system by protecting creditors
without limiting the bankruptcy judge’s discretion.242 Providing a
meaningful robust market test will contribute such improvement. The
market test helps to ensure that the price paid for the business is fair, that
there is no inside dealing, and that creditors are benefited by the sale.243 If a
market test is impractical because “time is of the essence,” heightened
scrutiny of the sale will safeguard against the same factors and work to
prevent the abuse of creditors.244
While this proposal is not presented as a panacea for the bankruptcy
system, or even for all of the problems associated with § 363(b) sales, it
intends to demonstrate that the debate between proponents of Chapter 11
plan confirmations and those of § 363(b) sales should not be viewed as an
either/or conflict. Both processes have a great deal to offer a distressed
business and its creditors; both also have significant drawbacks, not only to
the debtor and creditors, but to the system.245 By crafting a solution that
attempts to take advantage of the best aspects from each, the parties, the
system, and the community at large all benefit.
However, such a solution raises problems and questions of its own.
How does a court determine whether the period for the market test is
adequate? When proposed sales differ by terms other than price, who
decides which plan is superior and what criterion are used? Under what
circumstances should a market test be found to be cost prohibitive? Further
inquiry is also necessary to assess whether the tradeoffs of disclosure—
including deterring possible purchasers—will be outweighed by the benefits
of deterring abuse and having parties analyze the transaction. Nor is a
judge’s inquiry into the risk of, or fear of denying a “time is of the essence”
sale, alleviated. Further, such a proposal will not prevent parties from

Fraudulent § 363 preplan business sales undermine the principles and policies that
govern our bankruptcy system. In evaluating the impact of these § 363 preplan business
sales, we must recognize what is at stake. The finality of the sales, the integrity of the
bankruptcy system, and the people that are harmed by sweetheart deals and
management's greed justify a substantial limitation on the process and opportunity of §
363 preplan business sales.
Id.

241. See discussion supra Part II.
242. Multiple provisions in the Bankruptcy Code demonstrate the necessity of granting
bankruptcy judges wide discretion in their duties, including the ability to order a sale with limited
appealability under § 363 or the inherent equitable powers granted to the court in § 105. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 105, 363 (2006).
243. See discussion supra Part III.A.
244. See discussion supra Part III.B.
245. See discussion supra Part II.
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attempting to “game the system”246 by creating innovative solutions to
benefit themselves at the expense of others.
Even if a perfect solution is unattainable, the project is still a worthy
one. Improving the bankruptcy system and what it stands for, as attorneys,
academics, Congress, and the courts have been doing for two centuries, is
reason enough to continue to search for solutions for new problems as they
arise. Perhaps by improving the system, perfection may be achieved, for in
the words of Sir Winston Churchill, “[t]o improve is to change; to be
perfect is to change often.”247
Gennady Zilberman*

246. See JAMES B. RIELEY, GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW TO STOP PLAYING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL GAME, AND START PLAYING THE COMPETITIVE GAME xii–xiii (2001). Gaming
the system refers to a process in which an individual uses the rules and procedures of a system for
self benefit and in a way in which they were not intended. See id. (describing how players
attempting to subvert the system by following the letter of the law while going against its spirit
provides for detrimental long term effects).
247. STEPHEN MANSFIELD, NEVER GIVE IN: THE EXTRAORDINARY CHARACTER OF WINSTON
CHURCHILL 118 (George Grant ed., 1995).
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